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Abstract 
According to the literature, imagining how things would have 
been better in the past (counterfactual thinking) serves to 
prepare for future, highlighting prescriptions that can be 
converted in future intentions and in a more appropriate 
behavior. This view implicitly assumes that people think 
about controllable elements in their counterfactual thoughts 
and that the content of imaginary thoughts about the past and 
the future is the same. However, some studies (Ferrante, 
Girotto, Stragà, & Walsh, 2013) found a temporal asymmetry 
between past and future hypothetical thinking: thinking about 
how a failure could be a success in the future (prefactual 
thinking) elicit more controllable elements than thinking 
about how the same failure could have been a success in the 
past. In the present study, we replicated and extended 
previous findings in a more ecological setting. Athletes who 
have just run a marathon were asked to generate 
counterfactual or prefactual thoughts. The results showed the 
same temporal asymmetry found in Ferrante et al. (2013). In 
addition, we found that focusing on training, instead of 
focusing on other elements, resulted in a greater intention to 
train harder for the next marathon in the prefactual condition, 
but not in the counterfactual condition. Taken together, these 
findings question the postulated preparatory function of 
counterfactual thinking.   
Keywords: Counterfactual thinking; Prefactual thinking; 
Preparatory function; Prediction; Intention. 
Introduction 
Imagining how things could have been different in the 
past (counterfactual thinking) and how things could be 
different in the future (prefactual thinking) are two 
fundamental abilities of human being. Whereas prefactual 
thinking has gained the researchers’ attention quite recently, 
a larger body of literature has studied counterfactual 
thinking. Research showed that people are more likely to 
generate counterfactual thoughts after negative than after 
positive events (Roese & Hur, 1997), to imagine better 
alternatives to reality (i.e., upward counterfactuals; Roese & 
Olson, 1997), and to imagine what they could have done 
differently to obtain a better outcome (Girotto, Legrenzi, & 
Rizzo, 1991; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 
1993). Given these findings, the main postulated function of 
counterfactual thinking is to prepare the individual for the 
future (for a review see Epstude & Roese, 2008): the 
prescriptions included in counterfactual thoughts can be 
turned into behavioral intentions and, as a consequence, in a 
more appropriate behavior in similar future occasions.  
Nevertheless, some studies provided contrasting evidence 
regarding the frequency of controllable prescriptions in 
counterfactual thinking (Ferrante, Girotto, Stragà, & Walsh, 
2013; Girotto, Ferrante, Pighin, & Gonzalez, 2007; Pighin, 
Byrne, Ferrante, Gonzalez, & Girotto, 2011). Girotto and 
collegues (2007) found that, whereas readers of a story 
tended to modify, in their counterfactual thoughts, elements 
that were under the control of the protagonist (in line with 
the literature), participants who actually experienced a 
failure tended to modify elements that constrained their past 
attempt, such as the rules of the task (i.e., uncontrollable 
elements). Subsequent studies showed that thinking about 
how a failure could have been a success results in 
significantly less controllable modifications than thinking 
about how the same failure could be a success in the future 
(Ferrante et al., 2013). These results questioned the 
postulated preparatory function of counterfactual thinking: 
if counterfactual thinking serves to provide elements useful 
for future improvement, imagining a better past should be 
similar to imagining a better future.  
In the present study we aimed to replicate and extend 
previous results in a more ecological setting. In previous 
studies (Girotto et al., 2007; Ferrante et al., 2013), 
participants were presented with a given task twice (e.g. 
syllogism, scramble word quizzies), generating prefactual or 
counterfactual thoughts between the two trials of the tasks. 
But a potential drawback of this paradigm is that people 
were asked to solve a task for which they were not prepared 
and possibly perceived as trivial. In ecological situations, in 
which involved participants are prepared to face the event, 
controllable elements could be more available.  
We chose to analyze counterfactual and prefactual 
thoughts of athletes who have just run a marathon. In such a 
setting, participants are very involved and trained, and 
controllable modifications, such as the extent of their 
training, should be more available. However, our previous 
results (Ferrante et al., 2013) showed a temporally 
asymmetry in hypothetical thinking and seem to support a 
preparatory function only for prefactual thoughts. In order to 
provide more evidence on this issue, we asked participants 
to report their intention to train harder in the future. If 
counterfactual thinking has a preparatory function, 
counterfactual statements should be converted in 
behavioural intentions (Epstude & Roese, 2008, Smallman 
& Roese, 2009), and participants who think about training 
in their counterfactuals should report a greater intention to 
train harder in the future.  
In the present experiment we collected information on 
participants expertise as runners and on the actual marathon. 
Then, we asked them to generate counterfactual or 
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prefactual thoughts. Given that previous studies (Stragà, 
2014) showed that participants who generated controllable 
counterfactuals tended to be more confident in a future 
improvement, we asked participants to make some 
improvement predictions. Finally, we asked them to report 
their intention to train harder for the next marathon. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-four athletes (Male = 86%, Mage = 46.00, SDage =
10.80) participated in the experiment. Participants were 
recruited right after running a marathon (“Maratona 
Sant’Antonio” in Padova or “Maratona d’Europa” in 
Trieste).  
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to counterfactual or 
prefactual condition, and they were asked to fill in a 
questionnaire. First, participants were asked to indicate 
some general information, information on their expertise as 
runners and their finishing time in the actual marathon. 
Then, we asked participants to evaluate their performance 
and to rate their satisfaction with their performance. 
Next, according to the condition, participants completed 
the sentence “The marathon would have been better for me, 
if…” (counterfactual condition, n = 39) or the sentence 
“Next marathon will be better for me, if…” (prefactual 
condition, n = 35). After completing the sentence, only 
participants who expressed their willingness to run other 
marathons in the future completed the next part. After 
reporting when they would run the next marathon, they 
rated the likelihood of obtaining a better results in the next 
marathon and they estimated their finishing time. Finally, 
they reported their intention to training harder for the next 
marathon. 
Coding of the open-ended responses: Following Ferrante 
and collegues (2013), responses to the counterfactual/ 
prefactual statements were coded as controllable or 
uncontrollable. In particular, we coded as controllable all 
the elements that participants can control and change before 
or during the next marathon, that is: amount of training, 
effort, race strategies (e.g., speed variations during the race) 
and controllable physical conditions (e.g., rest, feeding). We 
coded as uncontrollable elements that referred to external 
conditions (e.g., weather, route) and uncontrollable physical 
problems (e.g., pain, injury).   
Results 
Preliminary analysis 
Seven participants reported general comments instead of 
actual counterfactual or prefactual thoughts, so they were 
removed from the analysis, leaving 67 participants. There 
was no difference between conditions in pre-manipulation 
measures. These measures did not have a relevant impact on 
our focal measures, so we did not report them in the 
subsequent results.  
Content of thoughts 
As regarding the content of thoughts, in line with previous 
studies (Ferrante et al., 2013) prefactual thinking elicited 
significantly more controllable modifications than 
counterfactual thinking (85% vs. 62%, respectively). 
Nevertheless, controllable modifications in counterfactual 
thinking reached 62%. Looking more deeply into the 
elements that participants changed, the majority of 
controllable modifications in counterfactual thinking 
referred to training.  
Predictions and intention 
Two participants reported that they did not intend to run 
other marathons and four participants wrote that their 
predictions referred to other type of races instead of a 
typical marathon, so we did not consider these participants 
in the subsequent analysis.  
As regards the improvement prediction, in line with 
previous findings (Stragà, 2014), results showed that 
participants who generated controllable modifications were 
more confident in a future improvement than participants 
who generated uncontrollable modifications. No other effect 
was found. 
We computed the amount of improvement expected by 
participants subtracting the time spent in the actual 
marathon from the expected time in the next marathon. The 
results showed only a marginally significant interaction 
between content and condition, but pairwise comparisons 
showed no significant effects.  
As regards the intention to train harder in the future, we 
recoded participants generated thoughts as “training” or “not 
training” modifications. In this way, we checked if the 
counterfactual/prefactual thoughts that modified the amount 
of training were transformed in behavioral intentions. 
Results showed that that, whereas in the prefactual condition 
participants who modified the amount of training in their 
thoughts actually intended to train harder than participants 
who modified other elements, in counterfactual condition 
this effect was not found.    
Discussion 
In present study, we replicated previous findings (Ferrante 
et al., 2013, Stragà, 2014) in a more ecological setting and 
extended our understanding of the effect of counterfactual 
and prefactual thinking. Three main results were found. 
First, prefactual thinking elicited significantly more 
controllable modifications than counterfactual thinking, 
replicating the results of Ferrante et al. (2013). Second, after 
generating a controllable counterfactual or prefactual 
thought as opposed to an uncontrollable one, participants 
were more confident in future improvement  (in line with 
Stragà, 2014), even if no effect was found when they 
estimated the amount of their improvement. Finally, the 
present experiment showed a new interesting result: 
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generating counterfactual thoughts referred to training, 
instead of other factors, did not increase the intention to 
train harder in the future. Conversely, prefactual thoughts 
that focused on training resulted in a greater intention to 
train harder in the future than prefactual thoughts that 
focused on other elements. This finding strongly question 
the preparatory function assigned to counterfactual thinking 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008): if counterfactual thoughts are 
useful for future improvement and they are converted in 
behavioral future intentions, a counterfactual that modifies 
the amount of training (e.g., “The marathon would have 
been better for me if I trained harder”) should result in 
greater intention to train harder for the next marathon, as 
happened in prefactual condition. If the primary function of 
counterfactual thinking is not to prepare for the future, we 
can only speculate about its possible role. Our data can be in 
line with a sense-making function: counterfactual thinking 
could serve to explain the past and to find relevant factors 
that prevented a better outcome. However, the question is 
still open. 
Moreover, in this setting we found an increase of 
controllable counterfactuals with respect to previous studies, 
mainly due to the training modifications, even if they did 
not affect the intention to train harder. Given these results, 
in the future studies we aim to replicate the training effect 
on intention in laboratory, manipulating the training 
availability before and after the task. In summary, this 
experiment supports our previous findings in a very 
different context, showing the robustness of our results, and 
brings new light to the effect of hypothetical thinking on 
intentions. The exploration of this effect is necessary for 
achieving a deeper understanding of the mechanisms 
underpinning counterfactual thinking. 
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